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Abstract
There has been considerable recent interest in “cloud storage” wherein a user asks a server to
store a large file. One issue is whether the user can verify that the server is actually storing the
file, and typically a challenge-response protocol is employed to convince the user that the file is
indeed being stored correctly. The security of these schemes is phrased in terms of an extractor
which will recover or retrieve the file given any “proving algorithm” that has a sufficiently high
success probability.
This paper treats proof-of-retrievability schemes in the model of unconditional security, where
an adversary has unlimited computational power. In this case retrievability of the file can be
modelled as error-correction in a certain code. We provide a general analytical framework for
such schemes that yields exact (non-asymptotic) reductions that precisely quantify conditions
for extraction to succeed as a function of the success probability of a proving algorithm, and we
apply this analysis to several archetypal schemes. In addition, we provide a new methodology for
the analysis of keyed POR schemes in an unconditionally secure setting, and use it to prove the
security of a modified version of a scheme due to Shacham and Waters under a slightly restricted
attack model, thus providing the first example of a keyed POR scheme with unconditional
security. We also show how classical statistical techniques can be used to evaluate whether the
responses of the prover are accurate enough to permit successful extraction. Finally, we prove
a new lower bound on storage and communication complexity of POR schemes.
∗D. Stinson’s research is supported by NSERC discovery grant 203114-11
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1 Introduction to Proof-of-retrievability Schemes
In a proof-of-retrievability scheme (POR scheme) [3, 6, 8, 12], a user asks a server to store a
(possibly large) file. The file is divided into message blocks that we view as elements of a finite
field. Typically, the file will be “encoded” using a code such as a Reed-Solomon code. The code
provides redundancy, enabling erasures or corrupted message blocks to be corrected.
In order for the user to be ensured that the file is being stored correctly on the server, a
challenge-response protocol is periodically invoked by the user, wherein the server (the Prover)
must give a correct response to a random challenge chosen by the user (the Verifier). This response
will typically be a function of one or more message blocks. We do not assume that the user is storing
the file. Therefore, in the basic version of a POR scheme, the user must precompute and store a
sufficient number of challenge-response pairs, before transmitting the file to the server. After this is
done, the user erases the file but retains the precomputed challenge-response pairs. Such schemes
are termed bounded-use schemes in [6]. An alternative is to use a keyed (or unbounded-use) scheme,
which permits an arbitrary number of challenges to be verified (i.e., the number of challenges does
not need to be pre-determined by the user). We will discuss these a bit later. Finally, the user
could retain a copy of the file if desired, in which case the responses do not need to be precomputed.
This might be done if the server is just being used to store a “back-up” copy of the file.
We wish to quantify the security afforded the user by engaging in the challenge-response protocol
(here, “security” means that the user’s file can be correctly retrieved by the user). The goal is that
a server who can respond correctly to a large proportion of challenges somehow “knows” (or can
compute) the contents of the file (i.e., all the message blocks). This is formalised through the
notion of an extractor, which takes as input a description of a “proving algorithm” P for a certain
unspecified file, and then outputs the file. Actually, for the schemes we study in this paper, the
extractor only needs black-box access to the proving algorithm. The proving algorithm is created
by the server, who is regarded as the adversary in this game. It should be the case that a proving
algorithm that is correct with a probability that is sufficiently close to 1 will allow the extractor to
determine the correct file. The probability that the proving algorithm P gives a correct response for
a randomly chosen challenge is denoted by succ(P). We assume that P always gives some response,
so it follows that P will give an incorrect response with probability 1− succ(P).
To summarise, we list the components in a POR scheme and the extractor-based security defi-
nition we use. Note that we are employing standard models developed in the literature; for a more
detailed discussion, see [3, 8, 12].
• The Verifier has a message m ∈ (Fq)
k which he redundantly encodes as M ∈ (Fq)
n.
• M is given to the Prover. In the case of a keyed scheme, the Prover may also be supplied with
an additional tag, S.
• The Verifier retains appropriate information to allow him to verify responses. This may or
may not include a key K.
• Some number of challenges and responses are carried out by the Prover and Verifier. In each
round, the Verifier chooses a challenge c and gives it to the Prover, and the Prover computes
a response r which is returned to the Verifier. The Verifier then verifies if the response is
correct.
• The computations of the Prover are described in a proving algorithm P.
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• The success probability of P is the probability that it gives a correct response when the
challenge is chosen randomly.
• The Extractor is given P and (in the case of a keyed scheme) K, and outputs an unencoded
message mˆ. Extraction succeeds if m̂ = m.
• The security of the POR scheme is quantified by proving a statement of the form “the Extractor
succeeds with probability at least δ whenever the success probability of P is at least ǫ”. In this
paper, we only consider schemes where δ = 1, that is, where extraction is always successful.
1.1 Previous Related Work
Blum et al [2] introduced the concept of memory checking. They formalized a model where per-
forming any sequence of store and request operations on a remote server behaves similarly to local
storage. Two seminal papers important to the development of POR schemes are [9, 11]. Lillibridge
et al. [9] first considered the problem of creating a backup of a large file by redundantly encoding
the using an erasure code and distributing pieces of the file to one or more servers. Naor and
Rothblum [11] studied memory checkers which use message authentication techniques to verify if a
file is stored correctly on a remote server. They also consider authenticators, which allow a verifier
to interact with the server and reconstruct the file provided that a sufficient number of “audits”
are all correct.
The concept of proof-of-retrievability is due to Juels and Kaliski [8]. A POR scheme incorporates
a challenge-response protocol in which a verifier can check that a file is being stored correctly, along
with an extractor that will actually reconstruct the file, given the algorithm of a “prover” who is
able to correctly respond to a sufficiently high percentage of challenges.
There are also papers that describe the closely related (but slightly weaker) idea of a proof-of-
data-possession scheme (PDP scheme), e.g., [1]. A PDP scheme permits the possibility that not all
of the message blocks can be reconstructed. Atieniese et al. [1] also introduced the idea of using
homomorphic authenticators to reduce the communication complexity of the system. Shacham and
Waters [12] showed that the scheme of Ateniese et al. can be transformed in to a POR scheme by
constructing an extractor that extracts the file from the responses of the server on audits.
Bowers, Juels, and Oprea [3] used error-correcting codes, in particular the idea of an “outer”
and an “inner” code (in much the same vein as concatenated codes), to get a good balance between
the server storage overhead and computational overhead in responding to the audits. A paper that
discusses a coding-theoretic approach in the setting of storage enforcement is [7]; this paper makes
use of list-decoding techniques, but it concentrates on the storage requirements of the server.
Dodis, Vadhan and Wichs [6] provide the first example of an unconditionally secure POR
scheme, also constructed from an error-correcting code, with extraction performed through list
decoding in conjunction with the use of an almost-universal hash function. We discuss this partic-
ular paper further in Section 1.3.
1.2 Our Contributions
In this paper, we treat the general construction of extractors for POR schemes, with the aim of
establishing the precise conditions under which extraction is possible in the setting of unconditional
security, where the adversary is assumed to have unlimited computational capabilities. In this
setting, it turns out that extraction can be interpreted naturally as nearest-neighbour decoding in
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a certain code (which we term a “response code”). Previously, error-correcting codes have been used
in specific constructions of POR schemes; here, we propose that error-correcting codes constitute
the natural foundation to construct as well as analyse arbitrary POR schemes.
There are several advantages of studying unconditionally secure POR schemes. First, the
schemes are easier to understand and analyse because we are not making use of any additional
cryptographic primitives or unproven assumptions (e.g., PRFs, signatures, bilinear pairings, MACS,
hitting samplers, random oracle model, etc.). This allows us to give very simple exact analyses of
various schemes. Secondly, the essential role of error-correcting codes in the design and analysis
of POR schemes becomes clear: codes are not just a method of constructing POR schemes; rather,
every POR scheme gives rise to a code in a natural way.
The success of the extraction process usually depends on the distance of the code used to initially
encode the file; when the distance of this code is increased, the extraction process will be successful
for less successful provers, thus increasing the security afforded the user. As we mentioned earlier,
we quantify the security of a POR scheme by specifying a value ǫ and proving that the extraction
process will always be able to extract the file, given a prover P with success probability succ(P) > ǫ.
(In some other papers, weaker types of extractors are studied, such as extractors that succeed with
some specified probability less than 1, or extractors that only recover some specified fraction of the
original data.) This allows us to derive conditions which guarantee that extraction will succeed,
and to compute exact (or tight) bounds, as opposed to the mainly asymptotic bounds appearing
in [6].
We exemplify our approach by considering several archetypal POR schemes. We consider keyed
schemes as well as keyless schemes. In Section 2, we first consider the fundamental case where the
server is just required to return one or more requested message blocks. Then we progress to a more
general scheme where the server must compute a specified linear combination of certain message
blocks. Both of these are keyless schemes.
In Section 3, we investigate the Shacham-Waters scheme [12], which is a keyed scheme, modified
appropriately to fit the setting of unconditional security. For this scheme, we note that uncondi-
tional security can be achieved only if the prover does not have access to a verification oracle. It
is also necessary to analyse the success probability of a proving algorithm in the average case, over
the set of keys that are consistent with the information given to the prover. This new analytical
approach is the first to allow the construction of a secure keyed POR scheme in the unconditionally
secure setting.
In Section 4, we look more closely at the numerical conditions we have derived for the various
schemes we studied and we provide some useful comparisons and estimates.
We desire that successful extraction can be accomplished whenever succ(P) exceeds some pre-
specified threshold. But this raises the question as to how the user is able to determine (or estimate)
succ(P). In many practical POR schemes, the only interaction a user has with the server is through
the challenge-response protocol. We show in Section 5 that classical statistical techniques can be
used to provide a systematic basis for evaluating whether the responses of the prover are accurate
enough to permit successful extraction.
The main overhead of keyed (unbounded-use) unconditionally secure schemes (relative to com-
putationally secure schemes) is in the storage requirements of the user. While this may be prob-
lematic in some circumstances, there are significant applications, such as remote backup services,
for which such schemes do genuinely represent a practical solution. We also show in Section 6 that
a significant additional storage requirement cannot be avoided in this setting, by proving a new
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information-theoretic lower bound on storage and communication requirements of POR schemes.
Our new bound is an improvement of the information-theoretic lower bound for memory checkers
and authenticators proven in [11].
We note that our goal is not to identify a single “best” POR scheme, but rather to provide a
useful new methodology to analyse the exact security of various POR schemes in the unconditionally
secure setting. The POR problem is one that lends itself naturally to analysis in the unconditionally
secure model; the schemes we consider are natural examples of POR protocols that do not require
cryptographic building blocks depending on computational assumptions.
For reference, we provide a list of notation used in this paper in Table 3 in the Appendix.
1.3 Comparison with Dodis, Vadhan and Wichs [6]
Our work is most closely related to that of Dodis, Vadhan and Wichs [6]. In [6], it is stated that
“there is a clear relation between our problem and the erasure/error decoding of error-correcting
codes”. Our paper is in some sense a general exploration of these relations, whereas [6] is mainly
devoted to a specific construction for a POR scheme that is based on Reed-Solomon codes.
We can highlight several differences between our approach and that of [6]:
• In the setting of unconditional security, the paper [6] only provides bounded-use schemes.
Our scheme is the first unbounded-use scheme in this setting.
• The paper [6] mainly uses a (Reed-Solomon) code to construct a specific POR scheme. In
contrast, we are studying the connections between an arbitrary POR scheme and the distance
of the (related) code that describes the behaviour of the scheme on the possible queries that
can be made to the scheme. Stated another way, our approach is to derive a code from a
POR scheme, and then to prove security properties of the POR scheme as a consequence of
properties of this code.
• The paper [6] uses various tools and algorithms to construct their POR schemes, including
Reed-Solomon codes, list decoding, almost-universal hash families, and hitting samplers based
on expander graphs. We just use an error-correcting code in our analyses.
• We base our analyses on nearest-neighbour decoding (rather than list decoding, which was
used in [6]), and we present conditions under which extraction will succeed with probability
equal to 1 (in [6], extraction succeeds with probability close to 1, depending in part on
properties of a certain class of hash functions used in the protocol).
• The “POR codes” in [6] are actually protocols that consist of challenges and responses in-
volving a prespecified number of message blocks; we allow challenges in which the responses
depend on an arbitrary number of message blocks.
• All our analyses are exact and concrete, whereas the analyses in [6] are asymptotic.
2 Analysis of Several Keyless Schemes
2.1 A Basic Scheme
As a “warm-up”, we illustrate our coding theory approach by analysing a simple POR scheme,
which we call the Basic Scheme. From now on, we usually refer to the user as the Verifier and the
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Figure 1: Basic Scheme
initialisation
Given a message m ∈ M, encode M as e(m) = M ∈ M∗. The message encoding
function e : M → M∗ is a public bijection. We will assume that M = (Fq)
k and
M∗ ⊆ (Fq)
n, where q is a prime power and n ≥ k. We write M = (m1, . . . ,mn),
where the components m1, . . . ,mn are termed message blocks.
The Verifier gives the encoded message M to the Prover. The Verifier also generates
a random challenge c ∈ {1, . . . , n} and stores c and the message block mc.
challenge-response
The Verifier gives the challenge c to the Prover. The Prover responds with the message
block r = mc. The Verifier checks that the response r returned by the Prover matches
the stored value mc.
server as the Prover. The basic scheme is presented in Figure 1.
Here is the adversarial model we use to analyse the security of a keyless POR scheme:
1. The Adversary is given the set of encoded messages M∗.
2. The Adversary selects m ∈M.
3. The Adversary outputs a deterministic1 proving algorithm for m, denoted P.
The success probability of P is defined to be
succ(P) = Pr[P(c) = mc],
where e(m) = (m1, . . . ,mn) and this probability is computed over a challenge c ∈ {1, . . . , n} chosen
uniformly at random.
Now we wish to construct an Extractor that will take as input a proving algorithm P for some
unknown message m. The Extractor will output a message m̂ ∈ M. We say that the POR scheme
is secure provided that m̂ = m whenever the success probability of P is sufficiently close to 1.
The Extractor for the Basic Scheme is presented in Figure 2.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose that P is a proving algorithm for the Basic Scheme for which succ(P) >
1−d/(2n), where the hamming distance of the set of encoded messages M∗ is d. Then the Extractor
presented in Figure 2 will always output m̂ = m.
Proof. Let M ′ be the n-tuple of responses computed by P and denote δ = dist(M,M ′), where
M = e(m). Denote ǫ = succ(P). Then it is easy to see that ǫ = 1 − δ/n. We want to prove that
M̂ = M . We have that M̂ is a vector in M∗ closest to M ′. Since M is a vector in M∗ such that
dist(M,M ′) = δ, it must be the case that dist(M̂,M ′) ≤ δ. By the triangle inequality, we get
dist(M,M̂ ) ≤ dist(M,M ′) + dist(M̂,M ′) ≤ δ + δ = 2δ.
1We note that, without loss of generality, the proving algorithm can be assumed to be deterministic. This follows
from the observation that any probabilistic proving algorithm can be replaced by a deterministic algorithm relative
to which the success of the extractor defined in Figure 2 will not be increased.
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Figure 2: Extractor for the Basic Scheme
1. On input P, compute the vector M ′ = (m′1, . . . ,m
′
n), where m
′
c = P(c) for all
c ∈ {1, . . . , n} (i.e., m′c is the response computed by P when it is given the challenge
c).
2. Find M̂ ∈ M∗ so that dist(M ′, M̂) is minimised, where dist(·, ·) denotes the hamming
distance between two vectors.
3. Output m̂ = e−1(M̂).
However,
2δ = 2n(1− ǫ) < 2n
(
d
2n
)
= d.
Since M and M̂ are vectors in M∗ within distance d, it follows that M = M̂ and the Extractor
outputs m = e−1(M), as desired.
2.2 General Keyless Challenge-Response Schemes
In the simple protocol we analysed, a response to a challenge was just a particular message block
chosen from an encoded message M . We are interested in studying more complicated protocols.
For example, we might consider a response that consists of several message blocks from M , or is
computed as a function of one or more message blocks. In this section, we generalise the preceding
extraction process to handle arbitrary keyless challenge-response protocols.
In general, a challenge will be chosen from a specified challenge space Γ, and the response will
be an element of a response space ∆. The response function ρ :M∗×Γ→ ∆ computes the response
r = ρ(M, c) given the encoded message M and the challenge c.
For an encoded message M ∈ M∗, we define the response vector
rM = (ρ(M, c) : c ∈ Γ).
That is, rM contains all the responses to all possible challenges for the encoded messageM . Finally,
define the response code (or more simply, the code) of the scheme to be
R∗ = {rM :M ∈ M∗}.
The codewords in R∗ are just the response vectors that we defined above.
The Generalised Scheme is presented in Figure 3. Observe that R∗ ⊆ ∆γ , where γ = |Γ|. We
will assume that the mapping M 7→ rM is an injection, and therefore the hamming distance of R∗
is greater than 0 (in fact, we make this assumption for all the schemes we consider in this paper).
We now describe the generalised adversarial model.
1. The Adversary is given the response code R∗.
2. The Adversary selects m ∈M.
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Figure 3: Generalised Scheme
initialisation
Given a message m ∈ M, encode m as e(m) = M ∈ M∗. The Verifier gives M to
the Prover. The Verifier also generates a random challenge c ∈ Γ and stores c and
ρ(M, c).
challenge-response
The Verifier gives the challenge c to the Prover. The Prover responds with r =
ρ(M, c). The Verifier checks that the value r returned by the Prover matches the
stored value ρ(M, c).
Figure 4: Extractor for the Generalised Scheme
1. On input P, compute the vector R′ = (r′c : c ∈ Γ), where r
′
c = P(c) for all c ∈ Γ
(i.e., for every c, r′c is the response computed by P when it is given the challenge c).
2. Find M̂ ∈ M∗ so that dist(R′, rM̂ ) is minimised.
3. Output m̂ = e−1(M̂).
3. The Adversary outputs a deterministic proving algorithm for m, denoted P.
The success probability of P is defined to be
succ(P) = Pr[P(c) = ρ(M, c)],
where M = e(m) and this probability is computed over a challenge c ∈ Γ chosen uniformly at
random.
Now we construct an Extractor that will take as input a proving algorithm P for some unknown
message m. The Extractor will output a message m̂ ∈ M. We say that the POR scheme is secure
provided that m̂ = m whenever the success probability of P is sufficiently close to 1. The Extractor
for the Generalised Scheme is presented in Figure 4.
The following theorem relates the success probability of the extractor to the hamming distance
of the response code. Its proof is essentially identical to the proof of Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 2.2. Suppose that P is a proving algorithm for the Generalised Scheme for which succ(P) >
1 − d∗/(2γ), where the hamming distance of the response code R∗ is d∗ > 0. Then the Extractor
presented in Figure 4 will always output m̂ = m.
Proof. Let R′ be the γ-tuple of responses computed by P and denote δ = dist(rM , R′), where
M = e(m). Denote ǫ = succ(P). Then it is easy to see that ǫ = 1 − δ/γ. We want to prove that
M̂ = M . We have that rM̂ is a codeword in R∗ closest to R′. Since M is a codeword such that
8
Figure 5: Multiblock Challenge Scheme
challenge
A challenge is a subset of ℓ indices J ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. Therefore, Γ = {J ⊆
{1, . . . , n}, |J | = ℓ} and γ =
(
n
ℓ
)
.
response
Given the challenge J = {i1, . . . , iℓ} where 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < iℓ ≤ n, the correct
response is the ℓ-tuple
ρ(M,J) = (mi1 , . . . ,miℓ).
Suppose the Verifier receives a response (r1, . . . , rℓ). He then checks that rj = mij
for 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ.
In this scheme, we have ∆ = (Fq)
ℓ.
dist(rM , R′) = δ, it must be the case that dist(rM̂ , R′) ≤ δ. By the triangle inequality, we get
dist(rM , rM̂ ) ≤ dist(rM , R′) + dist(rM̂ , R′) ≤ δ + δ = 2δ.
However,
2δ = 2γ(1 − ǫ) < 2γ
(
d∗
2γ
)
= d∗.
Since rM and rM̂ are codewords within distance d∗, it follows that M = M̂ and the Extractor
outputs m = e−1(M), as desired.
Observe that the efficacy of this extraction process depends on the relative distance of the
response code R∗, which equals d∗/γ. In the next subsections, we look at some specific examples
of challenge-response protocols.
2.3 Multiblock Challenge Scheme
We present a POR scheme that we term the Multiblock Challenge Scheme in Figure 5 (this is the
same as the “Basic PoR Code Construction” from [6]).
Lemma 2.3. Suppose that the hamming distance of M∗ is d. Then the hamming distance of the
response code of the Multiblock Challenge Scheme is d∗ =
(
n
ℓ
)
−
(
n−d
ℓ
)
.
Proof. Suppose that M,M ′ ∈ M∗ and M 6= M ′. Denote dist(M,M ′) = δ, M = (m1, . . . ,mn) and
M ′ = (m′1, . . . ,m
′
n). It is easy to see that r
M
J = r
M ′
J if and only if J ⊆ {i : mi = m
′
i}. From this, it
is immediate that dist(rM , rM
′
) =
(
n
ℓ
)
−
(
n−δ
ℓ
)
. The desired result follows because δ ≥ d.
Theorem 2.4. Suppose that P is a proving algorithm for the Multiblock Challenge Scheme for which
succ(P) >
1
2
+
(
n−d
ℓ
)
2
(
n
ℓ
) ,
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Figure 6: Linear Combination Scheme
challenge
A challenge is an n-tuple V = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ (Fq)
n.
response
Given the challenge V = (v1, . . . , vn), the correct response is
ρ(M,V ) = V ·M =
n∑
i=1
vimi,
where M = (m1, . . . ,mn) and the computation is performed in Fq. Suppose the
Verifier receives a response r ∈ Fq. He then checks that r = V ·M .
In this scheme, ∆ = Fq.
where the hamming distance of M∗ is d. Then the Extractor presented in Figure 4 will always
output m̂ = m.
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Theorem 2.2 and Lemma 2.3, once we verify that
1−
d∗
2γ
= 1−
(
n
ℓ
)
−
(
n−d
ℓ
)
2
(
n
ℓ
) = 1
2
+
(
n−d
ℓ
)
2
(
n
ℓ
) .
Remark: When we set ℓ = 1 in Corollary 2.4, we obtain Theorem 2.1.
2.4 Linear Combination Scheme
In this subsection, we consider the Linear Combination Scheme, in which a response consists of
a specified linear combination of message blocks (this could perhaps be thought of as a keyless
analogue of the Shacham-Waters scheme [12]). The scheme is presented in Figure 6. We will study
two versions of the scheme:
Version 1
Here, the challenge V is any non-zero vector in (Fq)
n, so γ = qn − 1.
Version 2
In this version of the scheme, the challenge V is a vector in (Fq)
n having hamming weight
equal to ℓ, so γ =
(
n
ℓ
)
(q − 1)ℓ.
2.4.1 Analysis of Version 1
Lemma 2.5. Suppose that the hamming distance ofM∗ is d. The hamming distance of the response
code of version 1 of the Linear Combination Scheme is d∗ = qn − qn−1 − 1.
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Proof. Suppose M,M ′ ∈ M∗ and M 6=M ′. Then V ·M = V ·M ′ if and only if V · (M −M ′) = 0.
Since M 6= M ′, there are qn−1 solutions for V , given M and M ′. There are qn − 1 choices for V ,
so the desired result follows.
We observe that d∗ is independent of d (the hamming distance of M∗) in version 1 of the
scheme.
Theorem 2.6. Suppose that P is a proving algorithm for version 1 of the Linear Combination
Scheme for which
succ(P) >
1
2
+
1
2
(
qn−1
qn − 1
)
.
Then the Extractor presented in Figure 4 will always output m̂ = m.
2.4.2 Analysis of Version 2
Lemma 2.7. Suppose that r ≥ 1 and X ∈ (Fq)
r has hamming weight equal to r. Then the number
of solutions V ∈ (Fq)
r to the equation V ·X = 0 in which V has hamming weight equal to r, which
we denote by ar, is given by the formula
ar =
q − 1
q
((q − 1)r−1 − (−1)r−1). (1)
Proof. We prove the result by induction on r. When r = 1, there are no solutions, so a1 = 0,
agreeing with (1). Now assume that (1) gives the number of solutions for r = s − 1, and consider
r = s. Let X = (x1, . . . , xs) and define X
′ = (x1, . . . , xs−1). By induction, the number of solutions
to the equation V ′ ·X ′ = 0 in which V ′ has hamming weight s− 1 is as−1. Each of these solutions
V ′ can be extended to a solution of the equation V · X = 0 by setting vs = 0; in each case, the
resulting V has hamming weight equal to s−1. However, any other vector V ′ of weight s−1 can be
extended to a solution of the equation V ·X = 0 which has hamming weight equal to s. Therefore,
we have
as = (q − 1)
s−1 − as−1
= (q − 1)s−1 −
(
q − 1
q
((q − 1)s−2 − (−1)s−2)
)
= (q − 1)s−1
(
1−
1
q
)
+
q − 1
q
(−1)s−2
=
q − 1
q
((q − 1)s−1 − (−1)s−1).
Remark. An alternative way to prove (1) is to observe that ar is equal to the number of codewords
of weight r in an MDS code having length r, dimension r − 1 and distance 2. Then (1) can be
derived from well-known formulas for the weight distribution of an MDS code. For example, in
[10, Ch. 6, Theorem 6], it is shown that the number of codewords of weight w in an MDS code of
length n, dimension k and distance d = n− k + 1 over Fq is
aw =
(
n
w
)
(q − 1)
w−d∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
w − 1
j
)
qw−d−1.
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If we substitute n = w = r, d = 2 into this formula, we get
ar =
(
r
r
)
(q − 1)
r−2∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
r − 1
j
)
qr−2−j
=
q − 1
q
r−2∑
j=0
(
r − 1
j
)
(−1)jqr−1−j
=
q − 1
q
r−1∑
j=0
(
r − 1
j
)
(−1)jqr−1−j − (−1)r−1

=
q − 1
q
(
(q − 1)r−1 − (−1)r−1
)
,
which agrees with (1), as proven in Lemma 2.7.
We will now compute the distance d∗ of the response code M∗. Here is a lemma that will be
of use in computing d∗.
Lemma 2.8. Suppose that M,M ′ ∈ M∗ and M 6= M ′. Denote δ = dist(M,M ′). Let rM and rM
′
be the corresponding vectors in the response code of Version 2 of the Linear Combination Scheme.
Then
dist(rM , rM
′
) = (q − 1)ℓ
((
n
ℓ
)
−
(
n− δ
ℓ
))
−
∑
w≥1
(
δ
w
)(
n− δ
ℓ− w
)
(q − 1)ℓ−waw, (2)
where the aw’s are given by (1).
Proof. Suppose that M,M ′ ∈ M∗ and M 6=M ′. Denote
M = (m1, . . . ,mn) and M
′ = (m′1, . . . ,m
′
n),
and let δ = dist(M,M ′). Let
J = {i : mi = m
′
i} and J
′ = {1, . . . , n} \ J.
Observe that |J | = n− δ and |J ′| = δ. For any V = (v1, . . . , vn) having hamming weight equal to
ℓ, define
JV = {j ∈ J : vj 6= 0} and J
′
V = {j ∈ J
′ : vj 6= 0}.
Denote w = |J ′V |; then |JV | = ℓ− w.
Suppose w ≥ 1. Then, given JV and J
′
V , the number of solutions to the equation V ·M = V ·M
′
is precisely (q − 1)ℓ−waw. When w = 0, the number of solutions is (q − 1)
ℓ. Summing over w, and
considering all possible choices for JV and J
′
V , we see that the total number of solutions to the
equation V ·M = V ·M ′ is(
n− δ
ℓ
)
(q − 1)ℓ +
∑
w≥1
(
δ
w
)(
n− δ
ℓ− w
)
(q − 1)ℓ−waw. (3)
The desired result follows.
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We can obtain a very accurate estimate for d∗ by observing that
aw ≈
(q − 1)w
q
is a very accurate approximation. After making this substitution, it is easy to see that the quantity
(3) is minimised when δ = d. This minimises (2), so we obtain
d∗ ≈
(
n
ℓ
)
(q − 1)ℓ −
(
n− d
ℓ
)
(q − 1)ℓ −
∑
w≥1
(
d
w
)(
n− d
ℓ−w
)
(q − 1)ℓ
q
. (4)
We have ∑
w≥1
(
d
w
)(
n− d
ℓ− w
)
(q − 1)ℓ
q
=
(q − 1)ℓ
q
∑
w≥1
(
d
w
)(
n− d
ℓ−w
)
=
(q − 1)ℓ
q
((
n
ℓ
)
−
(
n− d
ℓ
))
.
Therefore, from (4), we get
d∗ ≈ (q − 1)ℓ
((
n
ℓ
)
−
(
n− d
ℓ
))
−
(q − 1)ℓ
q
((
n
ℓ
)
−
(
n− d
ℓ
))
=
(q − 1)ℓ+1
q
((
n
ℓ
)
−
(
n− d
ℓ
))
. (5)
The following theorem uses the estimated value for d∗ derived in (5).
Theorem 2.9. Suppose that P is a proving algorithm for version 2 of the Linear Combination
Scheme for which
succ(P) >
1
2
+
1
2
(
1
q
+
(q − 1)
(
n−d
ℓ
)
q
(
n
ℓ
) ) ,
where the hamming distance of M∗ is d. Then the Extractor presented in Figure 4 will always
output m̂ = m.
3 Analysis of a Keyed Scheme: the Shacham-Waters Scheme
The Shacham-Waters Scheme [12] is a keyed proof-of-retrievability scheme. This means that the
Verifier has a secret key that is not provided to the Prover. This key is used to verify responses in
the challenge-response protocol, and it is also provided to an extraction algorithm as input. The
use of a key permits an arbitrary number of challenges to be verified, without the Verifier having
to precompute the responses.
We discuss a variation of the Shacham-Waters Scheme [12], modified to fit the unconditional
security setting. The main change is that the vector (β1, . . . , βn) (which comprises part of the key)
is completely random, rather than being generated by a pseudorandom function (i.e., a PRF). This
scheme, presented in Figure 7, is termed the Modified Shacham-Waters Scheme.
As we did with the Linear Combination Scheme, we will study two versions of the scheme. In the
first version, the challenge V is any non-zero vector in (Fq)
n, so γ = qn − 1. In the second version,
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Figure 7: Modified Shacham-Waters Scheme
• The key K consists of α ∈ Fq and B = (β1, . . . , βn) ∈ (Fq)
n. K is retained by the
Verifier.
• The encoded message is M = (m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ (Fq)
n.
• The tag is S = (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈ (Fq)
n, where S is computed using the following (vector)
equation in Fq:
S = B + αM. (6)
The message M and the tag S are given to the Prover.
• A challenge is a vector V = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ (Fq)
n.
• The response consists of (µ, τ) ∈ (Fq)
2, where the following computations are per-
formed in Fq:
µ = V ·M (7)
and
τ = V · S. (8)
• The response (µ, τ) is verified by checking that the following condition holds in Fq:
τ
?
= αµ + V · B. (9)
the challenge V is a vector in (Fq)
n having hamming weight equal to ℓ, so γ =
(
n
ℓ
)
(q− 1)ℓ. In both
versions, ∆ = (Fq)
2.
The information held by the various parties in the scheme is summarised as follows:
Verifier Prover Extractor
K = (α,B) M,S K,P
We first observe that, from the point of view of the Prover, there are q possible keys.
Lemma 3.1. Given M and S, the Prover can restrict the set of possible keys (α,B) to
Possible(M,S) = {(α0, S − α0M) : α0 ∈ Fq}.
Proof. Suppose that α = α0. Then equation (6) implies that B = S − α0M .
We will define a response (µ, τ) to be acceptable if (9) is satisfied. A response is authentic if it
was created using equations (7) and (8). Note that an authentic response will be acceptable for
every key K ∈ Possible(M,S). In the case of an acceptable (but perhaps not authentic) response,
we have the following useful lemma.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose that a response (µ, τ) to a challenge V for a message M is acceptable for
more than one key in Possible(M,S). Then (µ, τ) is authentic.
14
Proof. Suppose K1,K2 ∈ Possible(M,S), where K1 = (α1, B1), K2 = (α2, B2) and α1 6= α2. We
have B1 = S − α1M and B2 = S − α2M . Now consider a response (µ, τ) to a challenge V that is
acceptable for both of the keys K1 and K2. Then
τ = α1µ+ V ·B1 = α2µ+ V ·B2.
Therefore,
(α1 − α2)µ + V · (B1 −B2) = 0.
However, we have B1 −B2 = (α2 − α1)M , so
(α1 − α2)(µ − V ·M) = 0.
We have α1 6= α2, so it follows that µ = V ·M . Then we obtain
τ = α1µ+ V ·B1
= α1V ·M + V · (S − α1M)
= V · S.
Therefore the response (µ, τ) is authentic.
The verification condition (9) depends on the key, but not on the message M . It follows that
the Prover can create acceptable non-authentic responses if he knows the value of α (which in turn
uniquely determines the key, as shown in Lemma 3.1). This leads to the following attack.
Theorem 3.3. If the Prover has access to a verification oracle, then the Modified Shacham-Waters
Scheme is not unconditionally secure.
Proof. For every key K ∈ Possible(M,S), the Prover can create a response (µ, τ) to a challenge
V that will be acceptable if and only if K is the actual key (this follows from Lemma 3.2). The
Prover can check the validity of these responses by accessing the verification oracle. As soon as
one of these responses is accepted by the verification oracle, the Prover knows the correct value of
the key. Hence the Prover can now create a proving algorithm P that will output acceptable but
non-authentic responses. This algorithm P will not allow the correct message to be extracted.
In more detail, after the Prover has determined the key K = (α,B), he chooses an arbitrary
(encoded) message M ′ 6=M and constructs P as follows:
1. Given a challenge V , define µ = V ·M ′.
2. Then define τ = αµ+ V · B.
Suppose the Extractor is run on P. It is easy to see that dist(R′, rM
′
) = 0, so the Extractor will
compute M̂ =M ′, which is incorrect.
Even in the absence of a verification oracle, the Prover can guess the correct value of α, which he
can do successfully with probability 1/q. If he correctly guesses α, he can create a non-extractable
proving algorithm. This implies that it is not possible to prove a theorem stating that any proving
algorithm yields an extractor. However, we can prove meaningful reductions if we define the success
probability of a proving algorithm to be the average success probability over the q possible keys
that are consistent with the information given to the Prover.
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Suppose P is a (deterministic) proving algorithm for a message M = (m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ (Fq)
n. For
each challenge V and for every key K = (α,B) ∈ Possible(M,S), define χ(V,K) = 1 if P returns
an acceptable response for the key K given the challenge V , and define χ(V,K) = 1, otherwise.
Since there are γq choices for the pair (V,K), we define the average success probability succavg(P)
to be
succavg(P) =
∑
V ∈Γ,K∈Possible(M,S)
χ(V,K)
γq
. (10)
Lemma 3.4. Suppose there are D challenges V for which P returns an authentic response, and
hence there are C = γ −D challenges for which P returns a response that is not authentic. Then
succavg(P) ≤ 1−
C(q − 1)
γq
. (11)
Proof. If V is a challenge for which P returns an authentic response, then χ(V,K) = 1 for every
K. If V is a challenge for which P does not return an authentic response, then Lemma 3.2 implies
that χ(V,K) = 1 for at most one K. Therefore,∑
V ∈Γ,K∈Possible(M,S)
χ(V,K) ≤ C + qD = γq − C(q − 1).
The desired result now follows from (10).
Let’s now turn our attention to the response code. Even though a response is an ordered pair
(µ, τ), it suffices to consider only the values of µ in the extraction process (this follows because µ,
K and V uniquely determine τ ; see (9)). So we will define the response vector for a message M to
be rM = (M · V : V ∈ Γ). Observe that this response vector is identical to the response vector in
the Linear Combination Scheme.
Lemma 3.5. Suppose that P is a proving algorithm for the message M in the Modified Shacham-
Waters Scheme. Let rM = (M · V : V ∈ Γ) and let R′ be the γ-tuple of responses computed by P.
Then
dist(rM , R′) ≤
(1− succavg(P))γq
q − 1
.
Proof. Define C as in Lemma 3.4. Since a co-ordinate of rM differs from the corresponding co-
ordinate of R′ only when the response is non-authentic, it follows that dist(rM , R′) ≤ C. Equation
(11) implies that
C ≤
(1− succavg(P))γq
q − 1
,
from which the stated result follows.
Theorem 3.6. Suppose that
succavg(P) > 1−
d∗(q − 1)
2γq
, (12)
where d∗ is given by equation (2). Then the Extractor presented in Figure 8 will always output
m̂ = m.
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Figure 8: Extractor for the Modified Shacham-Waters Scheme
1. On input P, compute the vector R′ = (µV : V ∈ Γ), where (µV , τV ) = P(V ) for all
V ∈ Γ.
2. Find M̂ ∈ M∗ so that dist(R′, rM̂ ) is minimised.
3. Output m̂ = e−1(M̂).
Proof. Denote ǫ = succavg(P), let R
′ be the γ-tuple of responses computed by P, and denote
δ = dist(rM , R′), where M = e(m). We showed in Lemma 3.5 that
δ ≤
(1− ǫ)γq
q − 1
.
We want to prove that M̂ =M . We have that rM̂ is a codeword in R∗ closest to R′. Since M
is a codeword such that dist(rM , R′) = δ, it must be the case that dist(rM̂ , R′) ≤ δ. By the triangle
inequality, we get
dist(rM , rM̂ ) ≤ dist(rM , R′) + dist(rM̂ , R′) ≤ δ + δ = 2δ.
However,
2δ ≤
2(1− ǫ)γq
q − 1
< d∗,
where the last inequality follows from (12). Since rM and rM̂ are codewords within distance d∗
(which is the distance of the response code), it follows that M = M̂ and the Extractor outputs
m = e−1(M), as desired.
4 Numerical Computations and Estimates
We have provided sufficient conditions for extraction to succeed for several POR schemes, based on
the success probability of the proving algorithm. Here look a bit more closely at these numerical
conditions and provide some useful comparisons and estimates for the different schemes we have
studied.
We will consider three schemes. We have the following observations, which can be verified in a
straightforward manner:
1. For the Multiblock Challenge Scheme, extraction will succeed if
succ(P) > S0 =
1
2
+
(
n−d
ℓ
)
2
(
n
ℓ
) .
This is stated in Theorem 2.4.
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2. For the Linear Combination Scheme (Version 2), extraction will succeed if
succ(P) > S1 =
(
q − 1
q
)
S0 +
1
q
.
This follows from Theorem 2.9.
3. For the Modified Shacham-Waters Scheme, extraction will succeed if
succavg(P) > S2 =
(
q − 1
q
)2
S0 +
2
q
−
1
q2
.
This follows from Theorem 3.6, using the estimate for d∗ given in (5).
It is clear that S0, S1 and S2 are extremely close for any reasonable value of q (such as q ≥ 2
32, for
example). Therefore we will confine our subsequent analysis to S0 and state our results in terms
of the Multiblock Challenge Scheme. The formula for S0 is relatively simple, but it is complicated
somewhat by the binomial coefficients. Therefore, it may be useful to define an estimate that does
not involve binomial coefficients.
Theorem 4.1. Denote ǫ = 1−succ(P). Suppose that the following inequality holds in the Multiblock
Challenge Scheme:
ℓd
n
> ln
(
1
1− 2ǫ
)
. (13)
Then the Extractor will always succeed.
Proof. From (13), we obtain
ln (1− 2ǫ) > −
ℓd
n
.
Now −x > ln(1− x) for 0 < x < 1, we obtain
ln (1− 2ǫ) > ℓ ln
(
1−
d
n
)
.
Exponentiating both sides of this inequality, we have
1− 2ǫ >
(
1−
d
n
)ℓ
.
It is easy to prove that (
1−
d
n
)ℓ
>
(
n−d
ℓ
)(
n
ℓ
) ,
so it follows that
1− 2ǫ >
(
n−d
ℓ
)(
n
ℓ
) .
From this, we obtain
succ(P) >
1
2
+
(
n−d
ℓ
)
2
(
n
ℓ
) ,
and hence the Extractor will always succeed.
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ℓ d succ(P) n (Thm. 2.4) n (Thm. 4.1) ℓ d succ(P) n (Thm. 2.4) n (Thm. 4.1)
10000 10000 0.6 62143493 62133493 10000 1000 0.6 6218850 6213349
0.7 109145666 109135666 0.7 10919066 10913566
0.8 195771518 195761518 0.8 19581651 19576151
0.9 448152011 448142011 0.9 44819701 44814201
0.99 4949841645 4949831645 0.99 494988664 494983164
1000 10000 0.6 6218850 6213349 1000 1000 0.6 622334 6213349
0.7 10919066 10913567 0.7 1092356 10913567
0.8 19581651 19576152 0.8 1958614 19576152
0.9 44819700 44814201 0.9 4482419 4481420
0.99 494988664 494983164 0.99 49499315 49498316
100 10000 0.6 626398 621334 100 1000 0.6 62684 62133
0.7 1096413 1091357 0.7 109685 109135
0.8 1962669 1957615 0.8 196311 195761
0.9 4486471 4481420 0.9 448691 448142
0.99 49503366 49498316 0.99 4950381 4949831
50 10000 0.6 315719 310667 50 1000 0.6 31594 31068
0.7 550718 5456783 0.7 55093 545678
0.8 983840 9788076 0.8 98406 978807
0.9 2245736 2240710 0.9 224599 224071
0.99 24754183 24749158 0.99 2475440 2474916
10000 100 0.6 626398 621334 10000 10 0.6 67272 62133
0.7 1096413 1091356 0.7 114216 109136
0.8 1962668 1957615 0.8 200808 195761
0.9 4486471 4481420 0.9 453165 448142
0.99 4950336 49498316 0.99 4954838 4949832
1000 100 0.6 62684 62133 1000 10 0.6 6731 6213
0.7 109685 109135 0.7 11425 10914
0.8 196311 195761 0.8 20084 19576
0.9 448692 448142 0.9 45320 44814
0.99 4950381 4949831 0.99 495488 494983
100 100 0.6 6313 6213 100 10 0.6 677 621
0.7 11013 10913 0.7 1146 1091
0.8 19675 19576 0.8 2012 1958
0.9 44913 44814 0.9 4536 4481
0.99 495082 494983 0.99 49552 49498
50 100 0.6 3181 3106 50 10 0.6 341 311
0.7 5531 5456 0.7 576 546
0.8 9862 9788 0.8 1009 979
0.9 22481 22407 0.0 2270 2240
0.99 247565 247492 0.99 24779 24749
Table 1: Values of n which the Extractor will always succeed.
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Table 1 presents values of n (the length of an encoded message), for different values of ℓ (the
hamming weight of the challenge), d (the distance of the code) and the success probability of the
proving algorithm, such that the Extractor is guaranteed to succeed. We tabulate the value of n
as specified by Theorems 2.4 and 4.1. We see, for a wide range of parameters, that the estimate
obtained in Theorem 4.1 is very close to the earlier value computed in Theorem 2.4.
5 Estimating the Success Probability of a Prover
5.1 Hypothesis Testing
The essential purpose of a POR scheme is to assure the user that their file is indeed being stored
correctly, i.e., in such a manner that the user can recover the entire file if desired. We have
considered several schemes for testing whether this is the case, but in order to use these schemes
appropriately it is also necessary to pay attention to how we interpret the results of these tests.
Theorem 2.1 tells us that extraction is possible for the Basic Scheme whenever succ(P) is at least
(n− ⌊d2⌋+ 1)/n, hence the information we would like to obtain from using the Basic Scheme is
whether or not succ(P) exceeds the necessary threshold. Similarly, for the Multiblock Challenge
Scheme or the Linear Combination Scheme, we can compute a value ω such that extraction is
possible whenever succ(P) > ω−1
γ
. We can calculate succ(P) for a given proving algorithm P if
we know the values of P’s response P(c) for every possible challenge c ∈ Γ. However, the whole
purpose of a POR scheme is to provide reassurance that succ(P) is sufficiently large without having
to request all P(c) for all c ∈ Γ. Given the prover’s responses to some subset of possible challenges,
the user wishes to make a judgement as to whether he/she is satisfied that succ(P) is acceptably
high. This takes us straight into the realm of classical statistical techniques such as hypothesis
testing [4, 5].
Suppose the prover has given responses P(c) to t challenges c chosen uniformly at random
without replacement from Γ, and that g of these responses are found to be correct. We are concerned
that the prover’s success rate may not be high enough, so we are looking for evidence to convince
us that in fact it is sufficiently high to permit extraction. In other words, we wish to distinguish
the null hypothesis
H0 : succ(P) ≤
ω−1
γ
;
from the alternative hypothesis
H1 : succ(P) ≥
ω
γ
.
Suppose that H0 is true. Then the probability that the number of correct responses is at least g is
itself at most
t∑
i=g
(
ω−1
i
)(
γ−ω+1
t−i
)(
γ
t
) . (14)
If this probability is less than 0.05, then we reject H0 and instead accept the alternative hypothesis
(namely that succ(P) is sufficiently high to permit extraction. In this case we conclude that
the server is storing the file appropriately.) If the probability is greater than 0.05 then there is
insufficient evidence to reject H0 at the 5% significance level (so we continue to suspect that the
server is perhaps not storing the file adequately).
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Alternatively, if we choose the challenges uniformly at random with replacement, then the
condition for rejecting the null hypothesis becomes
t∑
i=g
(
t
i
)(
ω − 1
γ
)i(γ − ω + 1
γ
)t−i
< 0.05.
Example 1. Suppose that for the Basic Scheme n = 1000, and that the minimum distance of the
response code is 400. Then by Theorem 2.1 we find that extraction is possible whenever succ(P) is
greater than 0.8. Suppose the prover responds to 100 challenges that have been chosen uniformly
with replacement, and that 87 of the responses were correct. We find that
100∑
i=87
(
100
i
)
0.8i0.2100−i ≈ 0.047 < 0.05.
Thus, in this case there is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% significance
level, and so we conclude that the file is in fact being stored correctly.
On the other hand, if only 86 of the responses were correct, we observe that
100∑
i=86
(
100
i
)
0.8i0.2100−i ≈ 0.08 > 0.05.
In this case there is not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level,
and so we continue to suspect that the server is not storing the file adequately.
The benefit of this statistical approach is that given the observed responses to the challenges, for
any desired value of α we can construct a hypothesis test for which the probability of inappropriately
rejecting the null hypothesis (and hence failing to catch a prover that does not permit extraction)
is necessarily less than α.2 This is the case regardless of the true value of succ(P), and we do not
need to make any a priori assumptions about this value.
In Table 2 we give examples of a range of possible results of the challenge process and the
corresponding outcomes in terms of whether the null hypothesis is rejected at either the 5% or 1%
significance level.
5.2 Confidence Intervals
Another closely-related way to portray the information provided by the sample of responses to
challenges is through the use of confidence intervals. We define a 95% lower confidence bound θL
by
θL = sup
θ
∣∣∣∣ t∑
i=g
(
t
i
)
θi(1− θ)t−i < 0.05

This represents the largest possible value for succ(P) for which the probability of obtaining g or
more correct responses in a sample of size t is less than 0.05. Then the decision process for the
hypothesis test described in Section 5.1 consists of rejecting the null hypothesis whenever ω−1
n
< θL,
2Here we refer to probability over the set of all possible choices of t challenges.
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since if ω−1
n
is less than the critical value we know that the probability of a prover with success
rate at most ω−1
n
providing g or more correct responses is less than 0.05.
The interval (θL, 1] is a 95% confidence interval for succ(P): if a large number of samples of
size t were made and the corresponding intervals were calculated using this approach, then you
would expect the resulting intervals to contain the true value of succ(P) at least 95% of the time.
The hypothesis test can be expressed in terms of the confidence interval (θL, 1] by stating that we
reject H0 whenever
ω−1
n
does not lie in this interval.
Example 2. Suppose we have n = 1000 and d = 400 as in Example 1, and suppose that 90 of the
responses are correct. Then
θL = sup
{
θ
∣∣∣∣ t∑
i=90
(
t
i
)
θi(1− θ)t−i < 0.05
}
≈ 0.836
Then a 95% confidence interval for succ(P) is (0.836, 1], and hence we reject the null hypothesis,
as ω−1
n
= 0.8 does not lie in this interval.
ω−1
γ
t g α = 0.05 α = 0.01 ω−1
γ
t g α = 0.05 α = 0.01
0.8 100 100 X X 0.9 100 100 X X
0.8 100 95 X X 0.9 100 95 X X
0.8 100 90 X X 0.9 100 90 X X
0.8 100 85 X X 0.9 100 85 X X
0.8 100 80 X X 0.9 100 80 X X
0.8 200 180 X X 0.9 200 200 X X
0.8 200 175 X X 0.9 200 195 X X
0.8 200 170 X X 0.9 200 190 X X
0.8 200 165 X X 0.9 200 185 X X
0.8 200 160 X X 0.9 200 180 X X
0.8 500 435 X X 0.9 500 480 X X
0.8 500 430 X X 0.9 500 475 X X
0.8 500 425 X X 0.9 500 470 X X
0.8 500 420 X X 0.9 500 465 X X
0.8 500 415 X X 0.9 500 460 X X
Table 2: Outcomes of hypothesis testing for a range of responses. The columns headed by values
of α contain a tick if H0 is rejected at the corresponding significance level, and a cross otherwise.
5.3 Reacting to a Suspect Prover
One question that has not always been directly considered is what action to take when a prover is
suspected of cheating. In the framework of Section 5.1 this becomes the problem of what to do in
the case where there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. There are various possible
options at this point, and the choice of option will depend on factors such as the reason for storing
the file, and any costs and inconvenience that might be associated with associated with ceasing to
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use that server, or with switching to another storage provider. For example, if a server is simply
being used as a backup service for non-critical data and there is a high overhead associated with
switching storage providers, then a user will not want to be overhasty in taking action against a
possibly innocent server. In this case an appropriate action in the first instance might be to seek
more responses to challenges in order to avoid the possibility that the earlier set of responses were
unrepresentative of the reliability of the prover in general.
5.4 Comparison with Approaches Followed in the Literature
Ateniese et al. [1] observe that if succ(P) ≤ g
γ
(with g ∈ Z) then when P is queried on t possible
challenges chosen uniformly at random without replacement then the probability Prbad that at least
one incorrect response is observed is given by
Prbad = 1−
(
g
t
)(
γ
t
) ,
and they note that
1−
(
g
γ
)t
≤ Prbad ≤ 1−
(
g + 1− t
γ − t+ 1
)t
.
As examples of parameters, they point out that if succ(P) = 0.99 then to achieve Prbad = 0.95
requires t = 300, and Prbad = 0.99 requires t = 460. They comment that the required number t
is in fact independent of γ, sinced it is based instead on the required threshold for succ(P) -this
observation applies equally to our analysis.
Dodis, Vadhan and Wichs [6] use a similar approach to Ateniese et al., but in addition propose
the use of a hitting sampler that amounts to choosing which t elements to sample from a specified
distribution that contains fewer than
(
n
t
)
possible sample sets but still guarantees that Prbad is
higher than some specified value for a given value of succ(P) that is less than 1.
This analysis can be interpreted in the context of a hypothesis test to distinguish the null
hypothesis
H0 : succ(P) ≤ 0.99;
from the alternative hypothesis
H1 : succ(P) > 0.99.
If 300 challenges are made and all the responses are correct, then a 95% confidence interval for
succ(P) is (0.99006, 1], so there is enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% significance
level. However, a 99% confidence interval for succ(P) is (0.977, 1], so there is insufficient evidence
to reject the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level. If, on the other hand, 460 challenges were
made and all the responses were correct then a 99% confidence interval for succ(P) is (0.99003, 1]
and so in this case there is enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis at the 1% significance
level.
We note that this is a special case of the analysis in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. Specifically, Ateniese
et al. are focusing on determining the smallest number of challenges for which an entirely correct
response constitutes sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis at the desired significance level.
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While this does result in the smallest number of challenges for which there is still the potential
to reassure the user as to the appropriate behaviour of the prover, it has the drawback that even
a single incorrect response results in failure to reject the null hypothesis, regardless of whether it
is true. Taking a larger sample size has the benefit of increasing the probability that a false null
hypothesis is rejected, without adversely affecting the probability that a true H0 fails to be rejected.
For example, from Table 2 we see that if 90 correct responses out of 100 are observed then there is
insufficient evidence to reject the hypothesis succ(P) ≤ 0.8 at the 5% significance level. However,
if 180 correct responses out of 200 are observed then there is sufficient evidence to reject this null
hypothesis at the 5% significance level (in fact we even have enough evidence to reject H0 at the
1% significance level).
6 A Lower Bound on Storage and Communication Requirements
In this section, we prove a bound that applies to keyed POR schemes. Suppose that M is a random
variable corresponding to a randomly chosen unencoded message m. Let V be a random variable
denoting the information stored by the Verifier (i.e., the key), and let R be a random variable
corresponding to the computations performed by an extractor. It is obvious that the probability
that m can correctly be reconstructed is 2−H(M|V,R). Now, from basic entropy inequalities, we
have
H(M|V,R) = H(M,V,R) −H(V,R)
≥ H(M,V,R) −H(V) −H(R)
≥ H(M)−H(V)−H(R).
Suppose that the message can be reconstructed by the extractor with probability 1. Then we have
H(M|V,R) = 0. The inequality proven above imples that
H(M) ≤ H(V) +H(R). (15)
Now suppose that the extractor is a black-box extractor. In this situation, we have that
H(R) ≤ γ log2 |∆|, (16)
since there are γ possible challenges and each response is from the set ∆. The message m is a
random vector in (Fq)
k, so
H(M) = k log2 q. (17)
Therefore, combining (15), (16) and (17), we have the following result.
Theorem 6.1. Suppose we have a keyed POR scheme where the message is a random vector in
(Fq)
k, there are γ possible challenges and each response is from the set ∆. Suppose that a black-box
extractor succeeds with probability equal to 1. The the entropy of the verifier’s storage, denoted
H(V), satisfies the inequality
H(V) ≥ k log2 q − γ log2 |∆|.
We mentioned previously that Naor and Rothblum [11] proved a lower bound for a weaker form
of POR-type protocol, termed an “authenticator”. As noted in [6], the Naor-Rothblum bound also
applies to POR schemes. Phrased in terms of entropy, their bound states that
H(M) ≤ H(V)×H(R),
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which is a weaker bound than (15).
In the case of an unkeyed scheme, the extractor is only given access to the proving algorithm.
Therefore, H(M|R) = 0 if a black-box extractor succeeds with probability equal to 1. From this,
it follows that H(M) ≥ H(R) in this situation.
7 Conclusion
We have performed a comprehensive analysis of the extraction properties of unconditionally secure
POR schemes, and established a methodology that is applicable to the analysis of further new
schemes. What constitutes “good” parameters for such a scheme depends on the precise application,
but our framework allows a flexible trade-off between parameters. One direction of possible future
interest would be to consider the construction of further keyed POR schemes with a view to reducing
the user’s key storage requirements.
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Appendix
Table 3: Notation used in this paper
q order of underlying finite field
m message
mi message block
M message space
k length of a message
M encoded message
M∗ encoded message space
n length of an encoded message
d distance of the encoded message space
c challenge
Γ challenge space
γ number of possible challenges
r response
ρ response function
rM response vector for encoded message M
∆ response space
R∗ response code
d∗ distance of the response code
P proving algorithm
succ(P) success probability of proving algorithm
m̂ message outputted by the Extractor
K key (in a keyed scheme)
S tag (in a keyed scheme)
dist hamming distance between two vectors
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